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Abstract
A sensitivity characterization of a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA against 14.2 MeV neutrons is presented. The content of the internal
SRAMs and flip-flops were downloaded in a PC and compared with a golden version of it. Flipped cells were identified and
classified as cells of the configuration RAM, BRAM, or flip-flops. SBUs and MCUs with multiplicities ranging from 2 to 8
were identified using a statistical method. Possible shapes of multiple events are also investigated, showing a trend to follow
wordlines. Finally, MUSCA SEP3 was used to make assesment for actual environments and an improvement of SEU injection
test is proposed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
RECONFIGURABLE devices, and in particular Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) based on Static Random AccessMemory (SRAM-FPGAs) have gained popularity in various fields such as nuclear research, aviation and spatial missions,
to mention some. The main reasons are their high density of reconfigurable resources, as well as the ability to change their
functionality “on the fly”, which is also known as dynamic reconfiguration. On the other hand, applications running in aircrafts
must deal with hard real-time constraints, whereas outer-space devices usually process enormous amounts of data before sending
them to the station placed on Earth due to the reduced bandwidth in the downlink.
However, a major concern existing in these fields, especially in the space sector, is the high amount of radiation to which
these devices are exposed. These radiations, naturally present in such hazardous environments, may cause soft errors known as
Single Event Upsets (SEUs), which may alter the operation of the microelectronic components embedded in on-board systems.
SEUs can be classified in several subtypes. Thus, if only one memory cell is affected by the particle, it is called Single Bit
Upset (SBU). If more than one bit is flipped by the same particle, but in different logical address, it is called Multiple Cell
Upset (MCU). Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs) occur if the errors involve bitcells located in the same word. In SRAM-based
FPGAs, these errors may affect the configuration memory, therefore changing the functionality of the system. Hence, in order
to guarantee the correct operation of an autonomous system under such extreme conditions, tackling this problem becomes of
critical importance.
State-of-the-art SRAM-based FPGAs have been tested under radiation multiple times in order to assess their reliability. In
this article, a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA (manufactured with 28-nm bulk CMOS process) has been examined against neutrons. The
discussion below summarizes the literature concerning other radiation tests on 28-nm FPGAs.
In [1] results from heavy ions testing for Zynq-7000 are presented, with LETs (Linear Energy Transfers) varying from 2.6
to 17 MeV/mg/cm2. Cross-section values versus LET for configuration memory are provided, both for Block RAM and for
SRAM on-chip memory. In [2] it is presented a study of the influence of the angles of incidence and rotation on events induced
by low-LET heavy ions in a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA. The relevant conclusion is that there are significant differences in the MBU
cross section depending on the angles of incidence and rotation of the device. Also in [3] a similar study is presented for
Kintex-7 using heavy ions, the conclusion of which is that the number and size of MCUs is higher when ions strike along the
columns.
It can be proved that high-energy electrons and the secondary particles created by them are also capable of producing soft
errors. In [4] the energy dependence of electron-induced soft errors in a 28-nm bulk CMOS Xilinx Kintex-7 SRAM-based
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Fig. 1. Device Under Test and control system
FPGA is analyzed. The measured cross section ranges between 10−20 and 10−17cm2/bit using electrons with energy above
9 MeV. Similar experiments are presented in [5] for an Artix-7 and a Spartan-6.
Regarding neutrons, there are three excellent works presented in [6]–[8]. In [6] a study of power dissipation effects on a 28-
nm Xilinx Zynq 7000 FPGA-based System-on-Chip and its neutron sensitivity is presented, demonstrating that the temperature
variation caused by a higher operating frequency affects the cross section of the device. In [7] the dynamic SEU sensitivity of
designs on Kintex-7 and Stratix V, both of them 28-nm SRAM-based FPGAs, is presented. Also the sensitivities of the design
with and without Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) are compared. Finally, [8] discusses the effects of thermal neutrons and
high-energy hadrons issued from tests performed at three facilities: Institute Laue-Langevin (ILL), Laboratory of Subatomic
Physics & Cosmology (LPSC), and CERN. MCUs are not studied in these works.
This paper discusses the sensitivity of a 28-nm SRAM-based FPGA under 14.2-MeV neutron radiation and classifies errors
in SBUs and MCUs by using a variation of the statistical method presented in [9] and [10]. Issued cross sections are used to
make predictions for typical environments and to propose an improvement of fault injection tests. The methodology and the
experimental setup are described in Section II. Results are presented and discussed in Sections III and IV. Finally, conclusions
and clues of future work are summaryzed in Section V.
II. TEST SETUP
The experiments were performed with 14-MeV neutrons at the GENEPI2 (GEnérateur à NEutrons Pulsés Intenses) neutron
source at the LPSC (CNRS/UGA) [11]. The Device Under Test (DUT) is an Artix-7 FPGA (XC7A100T) embedded into a
Nexys-4 DDR board. It has a 25,611,008-bit (NCF ) configuration memory, 126,800 (NFF ) flip-flops and 4,860 Kb (NBR) of
Block RAM, from which 540 Kb are devoted to implement Error Correction Codes (ECC).
During the irradiation, a Raspberry Pi 3 was connected to the board through the Universal Serial Bus (USB) and GPIO
(General Purpose Input Output), as depicted in Fig. 1. As it must be close to the DUT to allow efficient communication, it
was placed inside the irradiation room and heavily protected to avoid the neutrons affecting its behavior. This device was in
charge of controlling the operations performed by the Artix-7. It was running Raspbian as operating system, and a modified
version of the OpenOCD software [12], extended to provide the routines needed to issue the correct commands to the Artix-7:
GCapture, GRestore, and readback operations. The software can be downloaded from a repository that was put in place by the
authors [13]. With the modified code it is possible not only to read back the whole memory, but also frame by frame.
Any word of the configuration memory and BRAM contents could be obtained by reading-back the appropriate frames.
However, flip-flop values must be captured by means of GCapture command prior to readback. This command saves the actual
content of the flip-flops into specific bits of the configuration memory. Therefore, it was essential to identify the addresses
of flip-flops and BRAM cells in the bitstream. In this way, before the tests, all the addresses of both flip-flop and BRAM
cells were inferred by using the logic allocation files generated by Xilinx synthesis tools during the “generate bitstream” step.
This file is created with extension .ll. By using this information it is easy to distinguish among errors occurred in flip-flops,
BRAM or configuration memory.
The GPIO of the Nexys4 board was used to provide the clock signal and I/O data to the FPGA. The USB was used to
drive the JTAG chain, so the bitstream could be loaded. It is also used to issue GCapture commands and to read-back the
configuration memory.
For each experiment, the following steps were made. First, the target design (a simple counter using 80,000 flip-flops and
BRAM cells in the FPGA) was loaded into the configuration memory. Every byte of the BRAM was initialized to a known
pattern of 0x55; and 50% of the flip-flops were initialized to 1s and 50%, to 0s. Then, the device was irradiated for a given
time. Finally, a GCapture operation was made in order to capture the current state of the flip-flops (as discussed before, such
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TABLE I
TECHNICAL DETAILS ABOUT RADIATION TESTS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVED BITFLIPS
Bitflips
Test Campaign Fluence Flux Conf. BRAM F-F
TN1
November
2017
0.43 1.43 56 0 0
TN2 0.48 1.62 76 0 0
TN3 1.89 2.10 278 0 2
TN4 1.26 2.10 186 0 1
TN5 2.82 2.35 383 0 2
TM1
May
2018
0.63 2.10 140 0 2
TM2 0.64 2.14 128 0 1
TM3 0.64 2.14 131 0 1
TM4 1.85 2.06 370 0 0
TM5 3.37 1.87 681 0 3
Total 14.01 2429 0 12
×109
cm−2
×106
cm−2/s
information can be read from the configuration memory), and then, read it back for the sake of comparison with the golden
values.
Radiation tests involved a single FPGA sample, but two different campaigns were made, in November 2017 and in May
2018. In each one of these, there were five different tests, which only differed in the memory contents and the radiation
exposure time.
III. RESULTS
A. Identification of cell types in the FPGA
The content inside an FPGA is read by means of a bitstream with the following characteristics. First of all, GCapture forces
the FPGA to copy the last state of the flip-flops in specific cells in the configuration memory, erasing whichever value was
previously present. Thus, possible bitflips in those bitstream locations will go unnoticed although the fraction is negligible
(∼ NFF /NCF = 0.5 %). This means that the effective size of the configuration memory to calculate the cross sections in
these radiation tests is N ′CF = NCF −NFF (25,484,208 bits). If GCapture had not been used to obtain the flip-flop content,
the value would have been NCF . The configuration memory content is merged to that of the BRAM to create the bitstream
sent to the Raspberry Pi. Therefore, the total size of the bitstream is NBS = NCF +NBR, 30,587,648 bits.
After every irradiation, the raw bitstream was saved on a PC for later analysis. This consisted in comparing the bit values
in the bitstream before and after the irradiation. If a cell had been flipped, its position in the bitstream was saved in a text
file bearing in mind that the position of the first one was 0 and that of the last one, NBS − 1. This position will be used as
address, ai, in later analysis. Finally, addresses were sought in two files containing the full set of addresses of the BRAM and
flip-flops and categorized in independent sets according to the kind of cell (flip-flops, BRAM or configuration memory).
Table I shows the neutron fluence received by the DUT in the different tests as well as the total number of bitflips observed
in each type of resources of the FPGA. At the end of Nov. 2017 campaign, dynamic tests, not shown in this manuscript, were
performed in the FPGA, which received 1.03·1012 n/cm2. The number of bitflips was higher in the second campaign leading
to an increase of ∼20% in the SEU cross-sections. There is not a clear reason to explain this: beam flux uncertainty, aging
[14] or displacement damage [15].
B. Extraction of multiple events: MBUs
As indicated in Table I, most of the errors were observed in the configuration memory, very few in the flip-flops and none
on the BRAM, probably due to the presence of ECC. Initially, it was difficult to determine the multiplicity of the events that
provoked the bitflips.
A first analysis that can be done is to investigate the occurrence of multiple bit upsets in the configuration memory, easily
detected as two or more bitflips in the same 32-bit word. The exact number of MBUs of different multiplicities is shown
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TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF MBUS OBSERVED IN THE CONF. RAM
Experimental MBUs False MBUs
NBF 2-bit 3-bit >3-bit 2-bit 3-bit Prob.
TN1 56 2 0 0 0.002 4.0 · 10−8 0.2%
TN2 76 9 0 0 0.003 1.0 · 10−7 0.3%
TN3 278 18 3 0 0.047 5.1 · 10−6 4.6%
TN4 186 16 0 0 0.021 1.5 · 10−6 2.1%
TN5 383 8 4 0 0.089 1.3 · 10−5 8.5%
TM1 140 16 1 0 0.012 6.4 · 10−7 1.2%
TM2 128 6 0 0 0.010 4.9 · 10−7 1.0%
TM3 131 10 2 0 0.010 5.2 · 10−7 1.0%
TM4 370 7 0 1 0.083 1.2 · 10−5 8.0%
TM5 681 17 8 4 0.282 7.5 · 10−5 24.5%
in Table II. However, it is advisable to rule out the accidental occurrence of several independent SBUs in the same word.
According to Tausch’s approach [16], the probability of observing one or more false MBUs in an FPGA is:
1− exp
(
−NBF · (NBF − 1) · (W − 1)
2 · LN
)
, (1)
NBF being the number of bitflips, W the data wordwidth, and LN the memory size in bits. The inner term inside the
exponential function is just the expected number of false 2-bit MBUs and a similar expression can be used to determine the
number of false 3-bit ones [17], [18]. The rightwards columns in Table II show the expected number of false MBUs as well as
the probability of occurring at least a false MBU of any multiplicity with W = 32, LN = N ′CF . The immediate conclusion is
that observed MBUs cannot be explained by the simple accumulation of SBUs, so multiple events must have occurred during
the experiments.
C. Extraction of multiple events: MCUs
It is possible to go beyond this approach to get a more appropriate depiction of the multiple events, namely in the configuration
memory of the FPGA. In 2014, Wirthlin et al. discovered that some measurable statistical properties of an experiment with
SBUs and MCUs are different from those observed in a theoretical only-SBU system [19]. Thus, the discrepancies can be used
to group the addresses of the flipped cells in multiple events allowing a quite accurate depiction of the typology of events
even without any information about the physical layout of the device. This idea was extended by the authors in other works
to systematize the procedure [9], [10]. In this case, the following scheme was implemented:
1) As previously said, every flipped cell in the configuration memory was given an address, ai, related to its position in
the bitstream ranging from 0 to NBS − 1. Flipped cells were located and their addresses, ai, saved to create a new set,
A, with integer values in increasing order. The size of A is, obviously, NBF , the number of bitflips observed in the
experiment.
2) The elements in A were combined in pairs to build a new set, DV , such that DV = {|aj − ai| , ai < aj ∈ A}. This
set has NDV = NBF · (NBF − 1) /2 elements with values between 1 and NBS − 1.
3) A histogram showing the number of repetitions of each element in DV was made.
4) In this histogram, some values are expected to occur more times than the rest, although repetitions can be attributed just
to random fluctuations. According to the theoretical only-SBU model, the expected number of elements repeated k times
can be calculated using the expression shown in the Appendix.
5) Then, a threshold value, kM , is calculated, such that the probability of an element being repeated kM times is lower
than 0.001. Thus, values appearing kN times, with kN > kM , are attributed to the existence of MCUs, since they are
not compatible with an only-SBU scenario.
6) Elements of the DV set appearing kM times or more are extracted. In the remainder of the paper, these values will be
referred to as “critical distances”. It is possible that different values show up in every test so the critical distances issued
from each round are merged in the final set and used to identify the multiple events.
Let us illustrate this technique with an example. In the TM5 test of Table I, 681 cells were flipped, from which a DV
set with 231,540 elements was built1. According to (2), in the Appendix, most of possible values should appear once or zero
1All the mathematical calculations shown in this paper, either simulations or data analysis, were done using Julia 1.1.1 [20].
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TABLE III
ANOMALOUSLY REPEATED ELEMENTS IN THE DV SETS
Round
DV-value (Number of repetitions)
TN1 3233 (6) 3231 (4)
TN2 3233 (18) 1 (9) 3232 (7)
TN3 3233 (45) 1 (24) 3231 (19) 3232 (16) 3234 (9)
TN4 3233 (28) 1 (10) 3232 (9) 3231 (5)
TN5 3233 (5) 3232 (18) 1 (15) 3231 (12)
TM1 3233 (31) 1 (18) 3232 (11) 3231 (6) 3234 (5)
TM2 3233 (21) 1 (6) 3231 (5)
TM3 3233 (22) 1 (14) 3232 (12) 3231 (7)
TM4 3233 (50) 3231 (13) 3232 (11) 1 (7)
TM5 3233 (86) 1 (45) 3232 (44) 3231 (41) 2 (15)
3230 (11)
times, but the expected number of elements repeated twice is 1383.2, three times 6.28, four times 0.023 and, finally, 5 times
6.9·10−5 so the occurrence of DV -elements 5 times or more is unlikely. However, it was found in actual results that 3233
appears 86 times, 1 does 45 times, etc. (Table III). These are the critical distances to relate pairs of cells and to start to group
bitflips.
Once we know the DV -elements appearing in excess, the “self-consistence technique” [10] was applied on each set of data
to reject false positives due to the interaction of MCUs. Table III shows the anomalously repeated DV -elements that passed
this test in each round. These results suggest that pairs with addresses differing in 1, 2, 3230, 3231, 3232, 3233 & 3234 should
be associated with MCUs so they must be adjacent cells. It is worth to indicate that all of these values appeared in almost every
round but were initially rejected by the self-consistence test, apparently very conservative, which confirms the importance of
repeating a test several times in order to improve the analysis of the results.
Since elements in DV were obtained by calculating the operation |aj − ai| (aj and ai being addresses affected by bitflips),
it is reasonable to think that flipped cells with addresses differing in 1 or 2 are associated with the MBUs listed in Table II
since they are probably in the same 32-bit word. On the contrary, values (3230-3234) were quite more surprising. However, it
was found out that they can be obtained as (32× 101)±{0, 1, 2}. These values have a clear correspondence with the internal
memory organization of the FPGA, since the size of a frame, which is the minimal reconfiguration unit of Xilinx FPGAs, is 101
32-bit words [21]. Fig. 2(a) shows a simplified schematic of the internal organization of the configuration memory according
to the information provided by the manufacturer. In a FPGA region, memory words of the same frame span vertically through
a column and, as indicated in the figure, columns are transferred to the FPGA from left to right. Thus, this can be attributed
to events that occurred in the same row (or in 2 nearby rows) and with a lateral distance of 0, 1 or 2 columns (Fig. 2(b)). No
other anomalous values around integer multiples of 3232, such as 6464 or 9696, were observed.
Table IV summarizes the number of events of different size observed after the experiments. It is important, in any case, to
determine if these events are actual or false, due to the random occurrence of bitflips in neighbor cells. In [18], it has been
proposed that the average number of false 2-bit MCUs for this technique is mR ·NBF · (NBF − 1) /LN , mR being the number
of critical DV distances used to relate pairs of addresses. In the worst case (TM5), this number is only 0.13, much lower than
the actual value for this test (105). Therefore, false multiple events are scarce, probably absent, in these experiments.
In previous works [9], [10], the statistical strategy for MCU extraction proposed the use of two different, yet complementary,
mathematical operations to obtain theDV : The positive subtraction (|aj − ai|, used in this paper) and the bitwise XOR (aj⊕ai).
The latter proved to be very effective for SRAMs, such as the ones that were analyzed in those works. However, in this case
the XOR operation was unsuccessful. Issued results were nonsense and they have not been included in this paper.
D. Cross sections for different events
From dividing raw results shown in Table IV and the uncertainty, derived from [22], by the fluence value and by the number
of bitcells of each type (configuration memory, flip-flops), the single-event cross sections with error margins were got for all
the possible multiplicities in each test. In Fig. 3, the weighted average value for each event multiplicity is shown. The absence
of errors in the BRAM yields that the expected number of bitflips is lower than 3.69 with a 95% confidence [22] so the cross
section for any event size is below 5.3 · 10−17cm2/bit, attributed to the use of ECC. In [8], a similar FPGA, probably the
XC7A25T, was irradiated in different facilities with disabled ECC. The cross section for the BRAM was similar to that of
the configuration memory for all the environments so the actual BRAM cross sections for 14-MeV neutrons should be similar
to those shown in Fig. 3, which provide clear evidence that the embedded ECC is efficient enough to remove errors in this
environment.
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Fig. 2. Details about how the content in the configuration memory of the FPGA is converted into a bitstream. (a) Simplified XY-structure of the FPGA as
indicated by the manufacturer. Bitstream is created concatenating columns from left to right. (b) Position of a cell with address n in the bitstream and the
addresses of some of its neighbors.
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Fig. 3. Cross sections for 14-MeV neutrons according to the event size. Note that lines are related to different vertical axis. Displayed values are the weighed
average of the values of all the tests. Note that there are 4 dots that are related to unobserved events in which we can only provide a maximum possible
value. Finally, in dash green, the cross sections issued from MUSCA SEP3 up to 6-bit events.
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TABLE IV
NUMBER OF MCUS THAT WERE EXTRACTED BY USING THE STATISTICAL APPROACH DISCUSSED IN SECTION III-C
Test Event Size
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TN1 35 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
TN2 31 13 1 4 0 0 0 0
TN3 142 45 1 8 1 1 0 0
TN4 108 30 2 3 0 0 0 0
TN5 230 63 1 3 0 2 0 0
TM1 57 22 5 6 0 0 0 0
TM2 74 20 2 2 0 0 0 0
TM3 63 20 1 5 1 0 0 0
TM4 231 62 1 3 0 0 0 0
TM5 390 105 9 4 0 5 0 1
TOTAL 1361 389 24 38 2 8 0 1
An interesting fact is that, for this kind of radiation, SBUs and 2-bit MCUs cross sections are on the same order of magnitude.
Data indicate that about 54% of bitflips are caused by SBUs and around 32% by 2-bit MCUs. Events with higher multiplicity
occur much less often. Also, it seems that the cross sections for larger events decrease with the multiplicity, but remain on
the same order. There are hints as well of a higher cross section for events affecting an even number (4, 6, 8) of cells . This
can be just a random statistical fluctuation due to the low number of observed events but a similar behavior has been found in
other memories [23]. Finally, the SBU cross section for flip-flops is higher (1.20 · 10−14 ± 4.60 · 10−15cm2/bit) than the one
of the configuration memory (Fig. 3). No multiple events were observed involving the memory cells with the captured value
of the flip-flops.
Fig. 3 also depicts the predictions issued from the tool MUlti-Scales Single Event Phenomena Predictive Platform (MUSCA-
SEP3) [24], developed at the French Aerospace Lab (ONERA), in Toulouse (France). The calculations of this tool consider a
dynamic neutron spectrum issued from a spectrometer (in this case, it was used for 14.2-MeV neutrons) and a technological
model (i.e. elementary cell topology), determined through a technical analysis and technological parameters, based to the ITRS
[25] (in this case, 28-nm bulk CMOS). One can see that the tool accurately predicts the cross sections for most multiplicities.
E. Hypothetical shape of MCUs
Accepting that Fig. 2 is accurate enough to depict the physical organization of cells in the configuration memory of the
FPGA, it is possible to associate the index in the bitstream of cells in multiple events with the possible position in the XY-plane
and, thus, try to study the shape of the multiple events. Tables V-VII show the observed shapes, the experimental probability
of occurrence and the signature, which is the distance from the MCU cells to the reference cell, marked in dark orange in the
figures, which is the cell in the MCU with the lowest index in the bitstream. Table VIII shows the shape of rare larger events,
as well as their signatures.
Apparently, multiple events tend to occur along the wordline. Indeed, only events affecting one or two adjacent columns
were observed but up to five rows were affected in Z8 (Table VIII). Directionality in very large events is common and it can
be related to the physical structure of the arrays of cells [23], [26]. MCUs seem to be more likely if they flip pairs of cells
in diagonal orientation making purely horizontal or vertical events extremely rare. Another interesting fact is that, setting the
leftmost column in the FPGA as #0, corresponding to the first 101 words, if the event affected two columns, the reference cell
is in an odd column for almost all of the MCUs. The only observed exception is 1 out of 391 2-bit MCUs, V2-shaped and
integrally occurring along an even column. This fact points out to the existence of some physical barrier separating pairs of
columns and avoiding the propagation of the events along the X-axis. On the contrary, SBUs are equally distributed showing
no preference for even or odd columns.
Shapes shown in Tables V-VIII are very similar to those observed by other authors after irradiating a 28-nm Xilinx Kintex-7
SRAM-based FPGA under ultrahigh energy heavy ions [27]. This is not surprising since both devices belong to the same
generation of 28-nm Xilinx’s SRAM-based FPGAs. In this work, multiple events are detected with a geometric method
(Euclidean distance between cells lower than
√
2) and occur along adjacent pairs of columns. Unfortunately, no information
was provided about the probability of every shape so it is impossible to know if some event signatures are more probable
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TABLE V
OBSERVED SHAPES FOR 2-BIT MCUS, SIGNATURE IN THE BITSTREAM AND PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.
Name Signature Shape Occurrence Perc.
D2A 3231 70 18.0%
D2B 3233 265 68.1%
H2 3232 49 12.6%
V2 1 5 1.3%
TABLE VI
OBSERVED SHAPES FOR 3-BIT MCUS, SIGNATURE IN THE BITSTREAM AND PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.
Name Signature Shape Occurrence Perc.
K3 1
3234
1 4.2%
L3A 1
3233
6 25.0%
L3B 1
3232
3 12.5%
L3C 3232
3233
7 29.2%
L3D 3231
3232
6 25.0%
V3 1
2
1 4.2%
than others. Finally, the authors also report that no event across three different columns was observed in concordance with the
experimental results presented here.
IV. DISCUSSION
First of all, it is necessary to pinpoint the fact that the statistical method presented by Wirhtlin et al. for the detection of
multiple events has worked in this FPGA, albeit with some changes such as the incorporation of the self-consistency principle
(described in [10]), backing up this strategy. Finally, the suitability of statistical methods for different families of FPGAs has
also been independently shown by Pérez-Celis and Wirthlin in a very recent paper [28].
A. MUSCA SEP3 Predictions
The MUSCA SEP3 methodology was developed by one of the authors for sequentially modelling all physical mechanisms
involved in the SEE occurrence, from the system down to the semiconductor target [24], [29], [30], using results from SRIM
[31], GEANT4 [32], [33] and physical models derived from Technology Computer-Aided Design (TCAD) simulations in
different technology nodes. The critical charge criteria of the 28-nm SRAM-based FPGA is optimized from 14 MeV neutron
experiments and its value is set to 0.5 fC.
As demonstrated in Fig. 3 by using MUSCA SEP3 it is possible to make estimations for known environments. For example,
it has been predicted that the expected soft error rate due to α-particles coming from radioactive impurities is 46,800 FIT/Mbit
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TABLE VII
OBSERVED SHAPES FOR 4-BIT MCUS, SIGNATURE IN THE BITSTREAM AND PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE.
Name Signature Shape Occurrence Perc.
L4A
3232
3233
3234
1 2.6%
L4B
3230
3231
3232
1 2.6%
S4
1
3232
3233
1 2.6%
X4 a
1
3233
3234
1 2.6%
Z4A
1
3233
3234
28 73.7%
Z4B
1
3231
3232
6 15.8%
a It could be an SBU+L3C
in standard technologies2. However, it is likely that the silicon used for the wafer had been purified. If so, the expected FIT
decreases to 3720 FIT/Mbit in Low Alpha (LA) wafers and even to 318 in Ultra Low Alpha (ULA) ones. Concerning cosmic
rays, Table IX shows the expected FIT for events of different size in Madrid (Spain), 40.41 ◦N, 3.70 ◦W, 650 m above sea
level, a place with an average relative flux of 1.35 with respect to that in New York city, a classical location chosen as reference
for estimating the neutron abundance on the Earth surface [34]. Atmospheric radiation fields composed by neutron, proton and
muon spectra were calculated by using ATMORAD [35]. Spectra are associated with angular properties for energy sampling
(neutron, proton) or from analytical functions (muon). The SER calculation combines the occurrence model validated by the
14-MeV measurements and a particle generator (Monte-Carlo) which considers the spectrum and the angular properties of
each particle. Neutrons are expected to provoke 66.2% of the events, protons 27.6%, and muons 6.2%.
The contribution of the Boron concentration interacting with thermal neutrons was not considered in the calculation because
it depends on the surrounding device material and this information is not available. Nevertheless, recent works have discovered
that the contribution of the terrestrial thermal neutrons cannot be neglected since it can be equivalent to that from the high-
energy neutron part [36]. Future works based on thermal neutrons tests and simulations are being currently conducted. In the
case of a standard or LA hypothesis, the main contribution is induced by the alpha emitters. Only the increase in proton and
muon contributions is likely to modify this trend.
B. Applications on SEU Injection tests
These results allow sketching an improvement of fault injection tests in FPGAs. Such tests constitute a very popular technique
to verify designs running in FPGAs. However, an actual environment should be emulated in such a way that bitflips must be
injected in random cells following a temporal pattern compatible with a Poisson distribution with a specific mean time between
failures (MTBF) [37]. Unfortunately, to the authors’ knowledge, errors are typically just injected as SBUs since it is unusual
to know the relation between logic and physical addresses to flip adjacent bits. Nevertheless, the results shown in this paper
allow dodging this drawback.
Fig. 3, or Table IV from which it was obtained, provides experimental data to determine the expected number of events of
each type, as well as their expected abundance. Restricting the study to up to 4-bit events, the last value for which there are
significant experimental data, it is possible to deduce that the ratio among 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-bit events is 61.1:18.2:1:1.8. In
21 FIT: 1 failure per 109 hours
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TABLE VIII
SIGNATURE AND PROPOSED SHAPE FOR LARGER EVENTS
Name Signature Shape Occurrences
P5
1
2
3232
3233
1
Z5
1
3233
3234
3235
1
Z6A
1
2
3233
3234
3235
4
Z6B
1
2
3231
3232
3233
3
R6
1 , 2
3232
3233
3234
1
Z8
1, 2, 3
3233
3234
3235
3236
1
TABLE IX
EXPECTED FIT FOR COSMIC RAYS, FOR THE XILINX ARTIX-7 FPGA AT MADRID (SPAIN)
Event Size FIT Event Size FIT
1 1651 4 315
2 768 5 112
3 523 6 61
other words, when the system decides to inject a failure, 74.4% of injections must be an SBU; 22.2%, a 2-bit MCU; 1.2%, a
3-bit one; and 2.2%, a 4-bit event.
If the system decides to inject an SBU, a cell is randomly selected, the containing frame is read, its value flipped, and the
new frame written in the FPGA.
On the contrary, if an MCU is chosen, the injection system must proceed as follows. First of all, the multiplicity of the new
event is decided taking into account the probability of each, deduced from the cross section values shown in Fig. 3. Next, the
shape of the event is determined according to the probabilities shown in Tables V-VII. A random cell in an odd column must
be chosen to play the role of reference cell and, afterwards, the rest of cells in the emulated MCU are flipped according to
the signature displayed in the tables. For this purpose, the involved frames must be read, modified and finally reloaded in the
FPGA.
Obviously, experimental results are only valid for this FPGA model and for 14-MeV neutrons impinging the device with
normal incidence. Thus, for instance, for other situations, such as atmospheric environments with a plethora of impinging
particles, energies and angular effects, the cross section values and MCU proportions can change. However, even though this
strategy does not perfectly mimic the error generation inside an FPGA, it is closer to reality than simulated experiments in
which only SBUs are considered.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
An Artix-7 FPGA was exposed to 14.2-MeV neutron radiation and SBUs/MCUs were extracted and discussed. In particular,
MCUs involving some critical distances of 1, 2 and [3230–3234] were observed in the configuration memory. These offsets
are related to this device addressing mode.
The calculated cross sections and error distribution probability will allow tuning the injection error tool developed by the
authors [38] for emulating MBUs and MCUs in an accurate manner. Also, they are appropriate for use in prediction tools such
as MUSCA SEP3.
APPENDIX
If NSB SBUs occur in a L-size memory at addresses A = {ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ NSB}, it is possible to create a new set such that:
DAV = {ai − aj , ai > aj}
In [9] & [10], it was demonstrated that:
1) The size of DAV is NDV = 12 ·NSB · (NSB − 1).
2) The mean number of elements repeated m times in DAV is, with with pk ≈ 2 · L−2 · (L− k):
NR (m) =
(
NDV
m
)
·
L∑
k=1
pmk · (1− pk)NDV −m.
In the previous work, the binomial expressions were replaced with the expression (1 + x)n ≈ 1 + nx to allow computing
that expression as NR (m) ≈
(
NDV
m
)
· 2mm+1 ·L1−m. However, if we use another approach,
L∑
k=1
a(k) ≈
∫ L
1
a(x) · dx, valid
for slightly changing functions, the final expression would be:
NR(m) ≈
(
NDV
m
)
·
·
NDV −m∑
k=0
(−1)k
k +m+ 1
·
(
NDV −m
k
)
· 2
m+k
Lm+k−1
(2)
Unlike old expressions, this is not restricted to NDV ≪ L.
REFERENCES
[1] L. A. Tambara, F. L. Kastensmidt, N. H. Medina, N. Added, V. A. P. Aguiar, F. Aguirre, E. L. A. Macchione, and M. A. G. Silveira, “Heavy Ions
Induced Single Event Upsets Testing of the 28 nm Xilinx Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC,” in IEEE Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW),
pp. 29–34, Jul. 2015.
[2] J. Tonfat, F. Lima Kastensmidt, L. Artola, G. Hubert, N. H. Medina, N. Added, V. A. P. Aguiar, F. Aguirre, E. L. A. Macchione, and M. A. G. Silveira,
“Analyzing the influence of the angles of incidence and rotation on MBU events induced by low let heavy ions in a 28-nm SRAM-based FPGA,” IEEE
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 2161–2168, Aug. 2017.
[3] D. S. Lee, G. M. Swift, M. J. Wirthlin, and J. Draper, “Addressing Angular Single-Event Effects in the Estimation of On-Orbit Error Rates,” IEEE
Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 2563–2569, Dec. 2015.
[4] M. J. Gadlage, A. H. Roach, A. R. Duncan, A. M. Williams, D. P. Bossev, and M. J. Kay, “Soft Errors Induced by High-Energy Electrons,” IEEE
Transactions on Device and Materials Reliability, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 157–162, Mar. 2017.
[5] M. J. Gadlage, A. H. Roach, A. R. Duncan, M. W. Savage, and M. J. Kay, “Electron-Induced Single-Event Upsets in 45-nm and 28-nm Bulk CMOS
SRAM-Based FPGAs Operating at Nominal Voltage,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 2717–2724, Dec. 2015.
[6] G. Bruni, P. Rech, L. Tambara, G. L. Nazar, F. L. Kastensmidt, R. Reis, and A. Paccagnella, “Power Dissipation Effects on 28nm FPGA-Based System
on Chips Neutron Sensitivity,” in 22nd International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC), pp. 1–6, Oct. 2014.
[7] A. M. Keller, T. A. Whiting, K. B. Sawyer, and M. J. Wirthlin, “Dynamic SEU Sensitivity of Designs on Two 28-nm SRAM-Based FPGA Architectures,”
IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 280–287, Jan. 2018.
[8] G. Tsiligiannis, S. Danzeca, R. García Alía, A. Infantino, A. Lesea, M. Brugger, A. Masi, S. Gilardoni, and F. Saigné, “Radiation Effects on Deep
Submicrometer SRAM-Based FPGAs Under the CERN Mixed-Field Radiation Environment,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 65, no. 8,
pp. 1511–1518, Aug. 2018.
[9] J. A. Clemente, F. J. Franco, F. Villa, M. Baylac, S. Rey, H. Mecha, J. A. Agapito, H. Puchner, G. Hubert, and R. Velazco, “Statistical Anomalies of
Bitflips in SRAMs to Discriminate SBUs From MCUs,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 2087–2094, Aug. 2016.
[10] F. J. Franco, J. A. Clemente, M. Baylac, S. Rey, F. Villa, H. Mecha, J. A. Agapito, H. Puchner, G. Hubert, and R. Velazco, “Statistical deviations from
the theoretical only-SBU model to estimate MCU rates in SRAMs,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 2152–2160, Aug 2017.
[11] F. Villa, M. Baylac, A. Billebaud, P. Boge, T. Cabanel, E. Labussière, O. Méplan, and S. Rey, “Multipurpose applications of the accelerator-based neutron
source GENEPI2,” Il Nuovo Cimento C: Geophysics and Space Physics, vol. 38, no. 6, p. 182, Nov. 2015.
[12] “Open On-Chip Debugger.” [Online]. Available: http://openocd.org/.
[13] “OpenOCD modification for Virtex-5/Artix-7: GCAPTURE, GRESTORE and readback operations support.” [Online]. Available: http://cort.as/-PUFI.
[14] F. L. Kastensmidt, J. Tonfat, T. Both, P. Rech, G. Wirth, R. Reis, F. Bruguier, P. Benoit, L. Torres, and C. Frost, “Voltage scaling and aging effects on
soft error rate in SRAM-based FPGAs,” Microelectronics Reliability, vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 2344–2348, Sep.–Oct. 2014.
[15] M. J. Gadlage, M. J. Kay, A. R. Duncan, M. W. Savage, J. D. Ingalls, D. Cruz-Rodriguez, and A. Howard, “Impact of Neutron-Induced Displacement
Damage on the Multiple Bit Upset Sensitivity of a Bulk CMOS SRAM,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 2722–2728, Dec.
2012.
[16] H. J. Tausch, “Simplified Birthday Statistics and Hamming EDAC,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 474–478, Apr. 2009.
VERSION FOR EPRINT UCM - ORIGINAL PAPER ON HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1109/TNS.2020.2977874 12
[17] F. J. Franco, J. A. Clemente, H. Mecha, and R. Velazco, “Influence of Randomness During the Interpretation of Results From Single-Event Experiments
on SRAMs,” IEEE Transactions on Device and Material Reliability, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 104–111, Mar. 2019.
[18] F. J. Franco, J. A. Clemente, G. Korkian, J. C. Fabero, H. Mecha, and R. Velazco, “Inherent Uncertainty in the Determination of Multiple Event Cross
Sections in Radiation Tests,” in European Conference on Radiation and its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS2019), Sep. 2019. Submitted
for publication to IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science.
[19] M. Wirthlin, D. Lee, G. Swift, and H. Quinn, “A Method and Case Study on Identifying Physically Adjacent Multiple-Cell Upsets Using 28-nm,
Interleaved and SECDED-Protected Arrays,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 3080–3087, Dec. 2014.
[20] J. Bezanson, A. Edelman, S. Karpinski, and V. B. Shah, “Julia: A fresh approach to numerical computing,” SIAM Review, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 65–98,
2017.
[21] Xilinx, “7 Series FPGAs Configuration User Guide. UG470 (v1.13.1) August 20, 2018.” [Online]. Available: https://www.xilinx.com/support/
documentation/user_guides/ug470_7Series_Config.pdf.
[22] J. L. Autran, D. Munteanu, P. Roche, and G. Gasiot, “Real-time soft-error rate measurements: A review,” Microelectronics Reliability, vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1455–1476, Aug. 2014.
[23] T. Kato, T. Yamazaki, N. Saito, and H. Matsuyama, “Neutron-Induced Multiple-Cell Upsets in 20-nm Bulk SRAM: Angular Sensitivity and Impact of
Multiwell Potential Perturbation,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 66, no. 7, pp. 1381–1389, Jun. 2019.
[24] G. Hubert, S. Duzellier, C. Inguimbert, C. Boatella-Polo, F. Bezerra, and R. Ecoffet, “Operational SER Calculations on the SAC-C Orbit Using the
Multi-Scales Single Event Phenomena Predictive Platform (MUSCA-SEP3),” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 3032–3042,
Dec. 2009.
[25] “International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS).” [Online]. Available: http://www.itrs2.net/, 2019.
[26] W. Liao, M. Hashimoto, S. Manabe, S. Abe, and Y. Watanabe, “Similarity Analysis on Neutron- and Negative Muon-Induced MCUs in 65-nm Bulk
SRAM,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 66, no. 7, pp. 1390–1397, Jul. 2019.
[27] B. Du, L. Sterpone, S. Azimi, D. Merodio Codinachs, V. Ferlet-Cavrois, C. Boatella Polo, R. G. Alía, M. Kastriotou, and P. Fernandez-Martínez, “Ultrahigh
Energy Heavy Ion Test Beam on Xilinx Kintex-7 SRAM-Based FPGA,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 66, no. 7, pp. 1813–1819, Jul.
2019.
[28] A. Pérez-Celis and M. J. Wirthlin, “Statistical Method to Extract Radiation-Induced Multiple-Cell Upsets in SRAM-Based FPGAs,” IEEE Transactions
on Nuclear Science, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 50–56, Jan. 2020.
[29] G. Hubert, R. Velazco, C. Federico, A. Cheminet, C. Silva-Cardenas, L. V. E. Caldas, F. Pancher, V. Lacoste, F. Palumbo, W. Mansour, L. Artola,
F. Pineda, and S. Duzellier, “Continuous High-Altitude Measurements of Cosmic Ray Neutrons and SEU/MCU at Various Locations: Correlation and
Analyses Based-On MUSCA SEP3,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 2418–2426, Aug. 2013.
[30] G. Hubert, L. Artola, and D. Regis, “Impact of scaling on the soft error sensitivity of bulk, FDSOI and FinFET technologies due to atmospheric radiation,”
Integration, vol. 50, pp. 39–47, Jun. 2015.
[31] James Ziegler, “SRIM - The Stopping and Range of Ions in Matter.” [Online]. Available: http://srim.org/.
[32] S. Agostinelli et al., “Geant4: a simulation toolkit,” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers,
Detectors and Associated Equipment, vol. 506, no. 3, pp. 250–303, Jul. 2003.
[33] J. Allison et al., “Geant4 developments and applications,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 270–278, Feb. 2006.
[34] “Measurement and Reporting of Alpha Particle and Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices, JEDEC Standard no. 89A
(JESD89A).” [Online]. Available: https://www.jedec.org/standards-documents/docs/jesd-89a, Oct. 2006.
[35] G. Hubert and A. Cheminet, “Radiation Effects Investigations Based on Atmospheric Radiation Model (ATMORAD) Considering GEANT4 Simulations
of Extensive Air Showers and Solar Modulation Potential,” Radiation Research, vol. 184, no. 1, pp. 83–94, Jul. 2015.
[36] C. Weulersse, S. Houssany, N. Guibbaud, J. Segura-Ruiz, J. Beaucour, F. Miller, and M. Mazurek, “Contribution of Thermal Neutrons to Soft Error
Rate,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 1851–1857, Aug. 2018.
[37] F. Faure, R. Velazco, and P. Peronnard, “Single-Event-Upset-Like Fault Injection: A Comprehensive Framework,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science,
vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 2205–2209, Dec. 2005.
[38] F. Serrano, J. A. Clemente, and H. Mecha, “A Methodology to Emulate Single Event Upsets in Flip-Flops using FPGAs through Partial Reconfiguration
and Instrumentation,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 1617–1624, Aug. 2015.
